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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between gender diversity and 
firm financial performance, using a data set of 50 S&P 500 companies during 2015-2019. 
Gender diversity was measured through the percentage of women on the board and whether the 
board has a “critical mass” (of at least three women). In the results of the regression analyses, 
some significant relationships between variables were found. The regression between ROA and 
the percentage of women indicated a positive, significant relationship for ROA to the percentage 
of women. For the regression between ROA and the critical mass variable, no significant 
relationship was established. The results indicate that a critical mass may not be necessary for 
women to have a positive impact on a firm’s ROA. After trimming the data for outliers, a 
positive relationship was found between ROE and the percentage of women on the board. 
Consistent with other research, a positive relationship was also found between ROE and the 
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Over the recent years, women have made major strides in the corporate world. They have 
had increasing participation in the labor force and higher education and begun holding more 
corporate leadership positions at every level of an organization. An increasing number of 
companies are also making efforts to improve in terms of gender diversity. However, when 
considering one of the highest-ranking bodies of an organization, the board of directors, women 
remain in the minority in holding this role worldwide. The board of directors serves in an 
important position to guide the actions of a company, so as we see women make advances, this is 
an important area where their leadership is lacking, 
A company’s board of directors serves as a monitoring body over management with the 
aim of protecting shareholder interests. They hold responsibility over many strategic decisions 
for a company (Sarhan et al. 2019). The requirements related to the size of the board and 
composition are specific to each firm, with differences amongst firms and industries. There are 
some attributes that tend to be common criteria for the election of board members which include 
“independence, integrity, a good professional and financial status,” with knowledge of the 
industry, products, and consumers of the company, and the ability to make difficult decisions 
(Chitimus 2014). While there is research to suggest that men and women exhibit behavioral 
differences in the workplace (Chen et al., 2016), there is no evidence to suggest that women 
would perform as inferior board members to men. Yet, there is still a great disparity in gender on 
boards across the world.  
According to the Spencer Stuart Board Index (2019) which draws data from S&P 500 
boards, women made up 26% of all directors in 2019. This number has increased incrementally 
every year for the past five years. In 2015, the percentage was just 20% (Spencer Stuart, 2015). 
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Women not only remain in the minority, but they also tend to experience being the only woman 
in many group settings. In 2019, 99% of boards had at least one woman director, but only around 
90% have two or more (Spencer Stuart, 2019). The lack of gender diversity on boards has drawn 
international discussion and controversy. This has led some countries to make attempts towards 
the progression of more equal representation on boards. In some areas of the world, gender 
quotas have been enacted to increase the number of women on boards. For example, in 2002, a 
gender quota was legislated by the Norwegian government requiring women to make up at least 
40% of boards of public limited-liability companies (Torchia et al. 2011). Other countries have 
followed suit including Spain, Iceland, and France. In a different approach, Germany has 
legislated voluntary participation which asks firms to “comply or explain” with 
recommendations for diversity on boards (Joecks et al. 2012). In 2018, the United States saw its 
first gender mandate for boards with the passage of California Senate Bill No. 826 (Greene et al. 
2020).  
Clearly, the composition of boards is shifting and will continue to. This raises the 
question of what impact women have as board members. There are many ways in which this can 
be measured, so the following paper aims to explore the financial effect of greater gender 
diversity. Much of the current literature on the topic focuses on countries that have taken a more 
progressive approach toward requiring gender diversity on boards. This study will look at the 
boards of large-cap firms in the United States using recent data to investigate the relationship 
between varying levels of gender diversity and firm financial performance.  
2. Literature Review 
Numerous studies have been conducted to study the impacts of gender diversity on board 
of directors. Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that gender diversity has significant effects on 
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board governance. Female directors tend to have fewer attendance problems and positively 
influence the attendance behavior of male directors as well. They also find that boards with 
greater gender diversity tend to have more board meetings. Their research suggests that female 
board members appear to be tougher monitors (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Assuming that women 
serve as tougher monitors, Nguyen (2019) hypothesizes that board gender diversity may also be 
correlated with a lower cost of equity for firms. This research, using a sample of French firms, 
finds that the proportion of women directors is negatively correlated with cost of equity 
(Nguyen, 2019). This result is significant because it suggests that investors may have greater 
confidence in boards with women serving on them which would lower the firm’s riskiness. This 
could also lead the firm to improved financial performance.  
 Consistent with the evidence that women serve as better monitors on boards, Chen et al. 
(2016) find that boards with a greater proportion of female directors are also less likely to have 
internal control weaknesses. Further, the presence of women reduces the occurrence of internal 
control issues even when they do not serve on the audit committee (Chen et al., 2016). These 
results suggest that the presence of women on boards leads to greater effectiveness considering 
the important role of effective internal controls. Research by Saona et al. (2019) provides further 
evidence to support the idea that women directors lead to more effective boards. This study finds 
through a sample of European firms that more gender diverse boards help mitigate earnings 
management practices (Saona et al., 2019). The role of the board of directors is important in 
monitoring management and preventing opportunistic behavior. This research demonstrates 
further the potential value women can provide for boards.  
Another possible benefit gender diversity can provide to boards is reducing groupthink, 
“the failure of board members to consider alternatives to the dominant view when making 
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decisions” (Kamalnath, 2017). Kamalnath (2017) finds evidence which suggests that when 
female directors are independent and considered “outsiders,” they can help serve as a remedy to 
groupthink. Female directors often tend to be independent, or not having a relationship with the 
company except as a director. This research suggests that boards would improve decision making 
abilities with the presence of female, independent directors. This also could have impacts on the 
firm’s performance. 
2.a Financial Performance 
Considering the research mentioned, a business case can be made for the inclusion of 
women on boards. In particular, women on boards could contribute to improved financial 
performance for firms. This study aims to determine the relationship between the number of 
women on boards and the financial performance of firms. There are several studies that have 
looked at this relationship. However, the results are controversial. This may be due to a variety 
of reasons which will be discussed below.  
2.a.1 Positive Relationships 
There are several studies which find a positive relationship between financial 
performance and gender diversity on boards. Erhardt et al. (2003) find that board diversity, both 
ethnic and gender, is positively associated with financial performance. In this study financial 
performance is measured by return on asset (ROA) and investment (ROI). Firm data is collected 
from 1993 to 1998 and is for 117 large US companies. This research does not look exclusively at 
gender diversity, so when controlling for other forms of diversity, results could vary. Also, since 
the data used is over twenty years old, and board composition has shifted in terms of diversity, 
current research could also find different results.  
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 In another study, Carter et al. (2010) analyze the relationship between gender diversity on 
the board and financial performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. The sample used includes data 
from all Fortune 500 firms for the period 1998-2002. The results show that there is a positive 
relationship between board gender diversity and financial performance. In particular, the 
evidence shows that this is primarily through the audit function of the board. This study chooses 
a different measure for financial performance than Erhardt et al. (2003), but it still yields similar 
results. It also is slightly more recent, but still dated considering the changing demographics of 
many boards.  Further research with more current data would allow for more insights into how 
this relationship may have shifted as the composition of boards has shifted.  
2.a.2 Negative Relationships 
 In contrast, further research shows a negative correlation between board gender diversity 
and firm financial performance. In one study, Vemala et al. (2018) examine a sample of S&P 
500 firms from 2000 to 2011. This research is more current and considers both Tobin’s Q and 
accounting ratios including return on assets and equity (ROE). The results of the analysis find 
that there is a negative correlation between gender diversity and the firm’s Tobin’s Q ratio and 
ROA. However, there is a positive correlation when looking at ROE. This data is almost a 
decade old, but more recent than the studies mentioned previously. The more recent data could 
explain the varying results, and the longer time period used could also play a factor. Perhaps, the 
presence of female directors leads to short-term changes that do not last in the longer term. It 
also uses multiple measures of financial performance.  
 Another study conducted by Daunfeldt and Rudholm (2012) examines the same question 
but using companies listed in Sweden from 1997 to 2005. They find that more gender diverse 
boards tend to lead to lower returns on assets after two years (Daunfeldt & Rudholm, 2012). This 
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study uses a large data set of 20,487 companies of varying sizes rather than just large companies 
like much of the other research. Daunfeldt and Rudholm (2012) argue that large, successful firms 
may be more likely to choose women for their boards which could explain finding a positive 
relationship to financial performance. There also may be a stronger push from stakeholders of 
larger companies to have more diverse boards than for smaller ones. Rather than the presence of 
women on the boards leading to higher returns, the reverse of this may be true (Daunfeldt & 
Rudholm, 2012). Additionally, since this study uses Swedish data, variances could be due to 
cultural differences between the countries which could impact the acceptance of women on the 
boards and how likely they are able to influence change. 
According to research done by Adams and Ferreira (2009), these authors also find a 
correlation between gender diversity and performance. They measure performance through 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, and standard deviation of monthly stock returns for five years. The data used is 
from S&P 500, S&P MidCaps, and S&P SmallCap firms from the period of 1996 to 2003. Their 
results suggest that firms perform worse with greater gender diversity. Further, they find that in 
companies with strong rights for shareholders, greater gender diversity can be disadvantageous. 
However, in companies where more monitoring is needed, gender diversity can have positive 
effects (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). These results are consistent with the theory that woman 
directors are tougher monitors. Similar to the study by Daunfeldt and Rudholm (2012), Adams 
and Ferreira (2009) include firms of many different sizes in their sample. As discussed 
previously, this could explain why results are different from other studies which find a positive 
correlation because most of the other research focuses mainly on larger firms. This distinction is 
important because the function and purpose of a board for a smaller organization can vary 
greatly from that of a large publicly-traded corporation. The main difference is that smaller 
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companies likely have fewer shareholders, while large boards have many more shareholders that 
they are working to protect the interests of. In addition, the composition of these boards likely 
tends to differ to account for these differences.  
2.a.3 Inconclusive Outcomes 
 Obviously, there is not a clear answer to understanding the relationship between board 
gender diversity and financial performance. To make matters more ambiguous, some studies 
have found no significant relationship between board of director’s gender diversity and the 
financial performance of firms. Noland et al. (2016) use a global survey of data from 21,980 
firms and 91 countries. This study finds that the presence of women in corporate leadership 
positions may influence firm performance. More specifically, female executive officers 
demonstrate an impact. However, there is not sufficient evidence that female board members 
impact firm performance. They suggest that having more women on boards may not directly 
improve performance of the firm, but it may lead to greater inclusion of women in other 
corporate leadership positions (Noland et al., 2016).  
Another study conducted looks specifically at the gender quota enacted by Italy (Ferrari 
et al., 2016). By analyzing the changes from before and after the quota was in place, they find no 
significant impact on firms’ performance as boards became more gender diverse. The data 
collected is from 2007 to 2014. The authors mention the conservative gender culture in Italy 
which is slightly different than other European countries. This could potentially explain the lack 
of change from the increased number of women on the boards. However, the study also finds that 
the market positively receives the shift of boards as there is a positive effect on stock returns at 
the date of board elections (Ferrari et al., 2016). Gender quotas introduce another layer for 
analysis that studies in the United States do not have to consider. Also, cultural differences 
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between Italy and the United States could also have additional effects. These reasons could 
explain the different results of this study from others previously mentioned. 
2.b Need for Further Research 
There is not a clear consensus about what the impact is of having female board members. 
Rhode and Packel (2014) analyze and provide a comprehensive overview of recent studies to 
evaluate the business case for gender diversity on corporate boards. They conclude that the 
relationship between gender diversity and corporate financial performance has not yet been 
“convincingly established” (Rhode & Packel, 2014).  
The mixed results can also be explained further through the application of more 
theoretical perspectives. First, a few studies have addressed the limited number of women of 
boards and whether their presence is an example of tokenism. If on many boards, a single woman 
or the small number of women directors are viewed as a token, then this could inhibit the 
influence that they are able to have over the board. Joecks et al. (2012) conducted research to 
determine at which point a critical mass is established on boards. They find that three women (or 
about 30% of the board) may be the “magic number” for women on boards of German firms. 
After this point, firms tend to perform better (Joecks et al., 2012).  
Similar evidence is found in Norwegian firms in a study by Torchia et al. (2011). In this 
research, when a board shifts from two to three female directors, this increases the level of firm 
innovation. This research suggests that, if in previous studies, few women were on the boards, 
the results may change as women begin to make up a greater proportion of the board and reach a 
critical mass. It has been established that board of directors are continuing to become more 
gender diverse every year to this point. This reality suggests that further research should be 
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conducted now that more boards may have a critical mass of at least three women serving on 
them.  
Many questions remain unanswered through the analysis of the existing literature. 
Considering the contradictory nature of current research, lack of literature using recent data, and 
the shift in the composition of boards of directors over time, there is a strong indication that 
further research is necessary. This study aims to provide further clarity on this subject by using 
more current data (from the time period of 2015 to 2019) because of the trend towards greater 
gender diversity. It also considers two measures of gender diversity, both the percentage of 
women and introduces the critical mass variable, in order to determine if tokenism and critical 
mass theories can be applied to the results. Lastly, it will measure financial performance through 
return on assets and return on equity financial ratios to be able to compare the results to previous 
studies that have been conducted using the same metrics to see how these relationships may or 
may not have shifted over time due to the change in the demographic composition of boards. 
3. Methodology 
 Based on the objectives previously laid out, a model was developed to test the hypotheses 
that increased gender diversity on boards improves firm financial performance measured by 
higher ROA and ROE ratios. In addition, it is hypothesized that the presence of a critical mass of 
at least three women on a board also improves ROA and ROE. The variables included in this 
model are described in the next section.  
3.a Variables 
For this study, the main independent variable is board gender diversity. Two measures of 
gender diversity were used. The first is the percentage of women on the board (the total number 
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of female directors on the board divided by the total number of board members). This has been 
widely used in previous studies as a way to measure gender diversity on boards. Data on board 
members’ gender was manually collected from the board members’ profiles based on the 
pronouns and titles used to describe them. If a board member was referred to as “he” or “his” or 
had the title of “Mr.” they were counted as a male. Board members that were referred to as “she” 
or “her” or had the title of “Ms.” or “Mrs.” were counted as female.  
The second measure used is whether the boards had at least three women board members 
(“a critical mass”). Boards with fewer than three women received a value of “0” while boards 
with at least three women received a value of “1.” There is little existing research that considers 
critical mass theory when looking at gender diversity on boards; most of the existing literature 
focuses solely on the percentage of women on the board. This measure was included based on 
the limited research conducted applying critical mass theory to board of directors by Joecks et al. 
(2012), Erkut et al. (2008), and Torchia et al. (2011). The term critical mass is used to refer to 
“any context in which things change after a certain number of people get together or enter a 
setting” (Oliver 2014). It has been used in many settings when speaking about diversity – 
including gender, racial, and ethnic diversity. In the research by Joecks et al. (2012), Erkut et al 
(2008), and Torchia et al (2011), they all find that once a critical mass of three women has been 
reached on a board, this is when there starts to be significant differences. Joecks et al. finds this 
to be true with ROE in German firms, and Torchia et al. finds this relationship with firm 
innovation in Norway.  
The research by Erkut et al. differs in that it uses qualitative data, but it provides evidence 
for the importance of a critical mass of women on boards. It states that “having three or more 
women on a board can create a critical mass where women are no longer seen as outsiders and 
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are able to influence content and process of board discussions more substantially” (Erkut et al. 
2008). It helps create a dynamic that is more natural with less focus on gender. One woman that 
participated in the study described it as, “One woman is the invisibility phase; two women is the 
conspiracy phase; three women is mainstream” (Erkut et al. 2008). This study provides evidence 
that gender diversity not only influences the board but that it also matters the number of women 
that are present. Based on this research, the critical mass variable was included in order to 
provide a more in-depth look at the ways in which gender diversity can influence boards.  
The primary dependent variable used is firm financial performance which is measured 
through two financial ratios. The ratios chosen are return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE). The return on asset ratio is found by taking net income divided by total assets. Return on 
equity is calculated by taking net income over total equity. There are many ways to measure how 
a company is performing financially; these metrics were chosen because they are consistent with 
much of the prior research on this topic. They are also commonly used in other types of studies 
and in the business world as measures of financial performance. Return on assets is a 
measurement of how efficiently a company is using its assets to generate profit, while return on 
equity considers how well a company’s investments from shareholders are being used to create 
more income. While some studies use Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE were used most often, so they 
were the best option for comparability to the already existing literature.  
A number of other variables were included as control variables at the firm and board 
levels. The firm-level control used was firm size. This was computed by taking the log of a 
firm’s total assets. All the firms in the sample tended to be fairly large due to their selection from 
the S&P 500 Index. This is because the S&P 500 is made up of the largest publicly-traded 
companies in the US. Despite this, there was still variability amongst the size of firms in the 
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sample, and thus, this variable was included. The range for firm size was from 9.46 to 12.39 with 
a mean of 10.45 and standard deviation of 0.56. The board-level controls used were board size 
(the total number of directors on the board) and the average age of directors (sum of the ages of 
all directors divided by the total number of directors). The mean board size was 10 members 
with the minimum being 4 and maximum of 18. The standard deviation for board size was 2.49. 
The average age variable ranged from 51.5 years to 71.67 years, with a mean of 64.82 and 
standard deviation of 3.73. Dummy variables for year are also included to control for trends over 
time that would impact revenues or costs for a firm.  
These control variables were chosen because they were expected to have an impact on a 
company’s ROA or ROE. They are also consistent with the literature on the subject. For each 
variable chosen, data was collected for each year across the time period of 2015 to 2019. This 
time period was chosen because it was the most recent complete data available at the time of the 
data collection process. Previous studies varied in the length of time that data was collected, so 
five years was chosen as a feasible choice when considering the manual nature of the data 
collection process. A complete list of variables is included in Table 1 below.  
 
Table 1 
Descriptions of Variables 
Variable Symbol Description 
Year 2016 Y16 This is a dummy variable where if the data 
was for the year 2016, the variable would 
be “1,” otherwise it would be “0”.” This 
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was included to control for trends relating 
to the time period that could impact the 
profitability of a firm.  
Year 2017 Y17 This is a dummy variable where if the data 
was for the year 2017, the variable would 
be “1,” otherwise it would be “0”.” This 
was included to control for trends relating 
to the time period that could impact the 
profitability of a firm. 
Year 2018 Y18 This is a dummy variable where if the data 
was for the year 2018, the variable would 
be “1,” otherwise it would be “0”.” This 
was included to control for trends relating 
to the time period that could impact the 
profitability of a firm. 
Year 2019 Y19 This is a dummy variable where if the data 
was for the year 2019, the variable would 
be “1,” otherwise it would be “0”.” This 
was included to control for trends relating 
to the time period that could impact the 
profitability of a firm. 
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Board size BS The total number of directors on the board 
or the sum of the total number of male and 
total number of female directors.  
Percentage of women W The percentage of women on the board is 
calculated by taking the total number of 
female directors on the board divided by 
the total number of board members. 
Critical Mass CM Boards with fewer than three women 
received a value of “0” while boards with 
at least three women received a value of 
“1.” 
Average age of board A The average age of the board was found by 
taking the sum of the ages of all directors 
divided by the total number of directors on 
the board.  
Firm size S This was computed by taking the logarithm 
of a firm’s total assets. 
Return on Assets ROA Return on Assets is calculated by taking 
net income divided by total assets. ROA is 
a measurement of how efficiently a 





3.b Data Collection and Sample 
Data for this study was collected for a sample of fifty firms randomly selected from the 
S&P 500 stock market index. A full list of companies included in the sample is available in 
Appendix A. The S&P 500 Index is widely used to gauge large-cap US equities and contains 
companies listed on US stock exchanges only. Companies selected were listed on the index for 
each period from 2015 to 2019. Data on each firm was collected over this period from the 
Mergent Online database. Mergent Online provides information on publicly traded companies 
including financial ratios, annual reports, and executive profiles. The final sample contains 250 
data points and includes firms across different industries in the United States.  
Table 2 
Summarized Sample Data 
Return on Equity ROE Return on equity is calculated by taking net 
income over total equity. ROE is a 
measurement of how efficiently a company 
is using its equity to generate profit. 
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There are limitations of this sample that should also be addressed. The first being that only 
firms with large market capitalizations were included. This is an area where future research on 
this subject could be expanded. Data from smaller firms is not as readily available though, so 
conducting research on smaller firms would be challenging. Secondly, there are potentially other 
variables that could be used as control variables. Some studies used board independence, CEO 
duality, multiple directorships, or tenure of board members as control variables. Data for these 
variables was difficult to collect, as much of it is not required to be disclosed by companies, so 
for the scope of this study, these variables were not included. There are also other characteristics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Board Characteristics     
Number of directors 250 10 2.49 4 18 
Number of male 
directors 
250 7.64 1.98 3 14 
Number of female 
directors 
250 2.36 1.11 0 6 
Percentage of women 250 23.26% 0.09 0% 45.45% 
Critical Mass 250 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Average age 250 64.82 3.73 51.5 71.67 
Firm Characteristics 
ROA 250 6.48% 7.70 -36.06% 33.85% 
ROE 250 19.89% 37.64 -101.12% 370.45% 
Log(Firm size) 250 10.45 0.56 9.46 12.39 
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of board members, boards, and firms that are difficult to quantify that could impact financial 
performance. These include things such as corporate culture or the characteristics of specific 
individuals. In addition, a few studies also controlled for reverse causality, that is, considering 
that women may choose directorships at high-performing firms, or high-performing firms will 
choose more women as directors than those that are not. The following table includes data to 
describe the sample that was selected.  
 Since one of the main independent variables is whether or not a critical mass is present on 
the board, data comparing boards with and without a critical mass is shown in Table 3. For 
boards without a critical mass, the boards tended to be smaller. Also, these boards tended to have 
older directors on average. The average ROA for boards without a critical mass was 6.35 while it 
was slightly higher for boards with a critical mass at 6.68. Likewise for ROE, boards without a 
critical mass had an average that was slightly lower at 19.84 whereas the average for boards with 
a critical mass was 19.98. Based on these differences, it can be reasonably expected that the 
critical mass variable will have an impact on how firms perform financially. Also, boards with 
and without a critical mass seem to have somewhat different characteristics which may also play 









Comparison of Firm Data With and Without a Critical Mass  
Variable No Critical Mass Critical Mass 
Average Total Number of Directors 9.07236842      11.43878  
Average Age 65.2093525      64.23368  
Average ROA 6.34960526        6.67551  
Average ROE 19.8424941      19.97558  
 
3.c Analysis of Data 
Before the data was analyzed, it was prepared by checking for missing data points. A few 
firms were found to have missing data for the financial ratios. For these data points, the ratios 
were manually calculated using the financial data available within the Mergent Online database. 
The data were then examined through regression analysis in Microsoft Excel and SPSS. This 
study uses four models of regression.  
Two of the models use the percentage of gender diversity variable with each measure of financial 
performance (ROA and ROE). 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐼: 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 (𝑅𝑂𝐴) = 𝐵𝑆 + 𝑊 + 𝐴 + 𝑆 + 𝑌16 + 𝑌17 + 𝑌18 + 𝑌19 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐼𝐼: 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑅𝑂𝐸) = 𝐵𝑆 + 𝑊 + 𝐴 + 𝑆 +  𝑌16 + 𝑌17 + 𝑌18 + 𝑌19 





𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐼𝐼𝐼: 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 (𝑅𝑂𝐴) = 𝐵𝑆 + 𝐶𝑀 + 𝐴 + 𝑆 + 𝑌16 + 𝑌17 + 𝑌18 + 𝑌19 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐼𝑉: 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑅𝑂𝐸) = 𝐵𝑆 + 𝐶𝑀 + 𝐴 + 𝑆 + 𝑌16 + 𝑌17 + 𝑌18 + 𝑌19  
Lastly, the regressions were checked for multicollinearity. The results of the regression analysis 
and collinearity diagnostics are discussed in the next section.  
4. Results 
Through the regression analyses, some significant relationships between variables were 
found. Using model I, the regression indicated that there was a positive, significant relationship 
between the percentage of women and ROA. This result is consistent with the hypothesis formed 
during the creation of the model. Additionally, average age and firm size were negatively 
correlated with ROA. These results were statistically significant at the 5% confidence level, 
except for average age which was at the 10% confidence level. The full results are included in 
Table 4 below. For the regression model II, which uses ROE as the dependent variable, there was 
a negative relationship between the average age and firm size and ROE. The results were 
statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. However, a statistically significant 
relationship between the percentage of women and ROE was not established. This is 
contradictory to the hypothesis that was established previously and was a surprising result to 
find. The results of this regression model are again included in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Results from Models I and II (whether boards with greater percentages of women are more likely 
to have higher ROA and ROE). 





Model 1a Model 2a 
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Board size + 0.1073 0.6244 0.2127 0.8461 
Percentage 
of women 
+ 11.6217 0.0444* -9.2144 0.7491 
Average age - -0.2543 0.0577* -1.7797 0.0082* 
Firm size + -4.0966 0.0000* -11.3943 0.0165* 
Year-16 + 0.4283 0.7731 3.8420 0.6052 
Year-17 + 1.1138 0.4628 7.0367 0.3540 
Year-18 + 0.7707 0.6226 4.7779 0.5421 
Year-19 + 1.0886 0.5102 8.2058 0.3214 
 
Using Models III and IV, some relationships were found to be statistically significant 
once again; however, critical mass was not significant with either ROA or ROE. The variables 
that were found to have a negative relationship with ROA are average age and firm size. With 
ROE, age and firm size also had a negative relationship. These results were again surprising, as it 
was hypothesized that the critical mass variable would have a positive relationship with both 
ratios. The regression results for Models III and IV are included in Table 5. 
Finally, the results of the collinearity diagnostics found there to be no issues of 
multicollinearity with each of the models used. Based on these results, the p-values in the Tables 





Results from Models I and II (whether boards with a critical mass are more likely to have higher 
ROA and ROE). 
P-values that are statistically significant are noted with a * 
Variable Predicted 
sign 
Model 3a Model 4a 
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Board size + 0.0006 0.9978 0.1254 0.9135 
Critical 
Mass 
+ 1.2355 0.2737 1.6452 0.7692 
Average age - -0.2917 0.0284* -1.7192 0.0095* 
Firm size + -3.7577 0.0001* -12.1661 0.0091* 
Year-16 + 0.5954 0.6897 3.5777 0.6295 
Year-17 + 1.3383 0.3787 6.6606 0.3784 
Year-18 + 1.0070 0.5212 4.2802 0.5835 
Year-19 + 1.4788 0.3694 7.4272 0.3648 
 
After considering the full sample without removing any data points, the data was 
truncated to exclude the 2% largest and 2% smallest values for both ROA and ROE. The 2% 
trimmed means are presented in Table 6. Before trimming, the standard deviation for return on 
equity was 37.64% with a range from -101.12% to 370.45%. This spread is very large and may 
include firms not necessarily operating under normal conditions. In addition, when looking at the 
firms excluded, all five from the lowest 2% happen to be firms from the utility industry. This 
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may indicate an underlying industry-wide issue rather than performance issues of individual 
boards. If this is the case, this would not be indicative of normal conditions, and it would be 
important to consider the data without these outliers that lower the mean ROE for the sample. On 
the other hand, ROA had a mean of 6.48% before truncation and a range from -36.06% to 
33.85%. The standard deviation was 7.70. This sample seemed less likely to have outliers which 
were extreme in nature and considered abnormal; however, the same method for trimming was 
also used for ROA and considered for consistency. After truncation, this excluded ten boards 
from the data, so there were 240 data points contained in each sample. The four models of 
regression were run again with the new set of data. 
Table 6 
2% Trimmed Means of ROA and ROE 




 The additional regression results varied somewhat from the original results. Under model 
I, a positive relationship was still found between the percentage of women on the board and 
ROA. The p-value was more significant than the one found previously. These results meet the 
expectations formed in the hypothesis. In addition, firm size was found to have a negative 
relationship with ROA at the 1% confidence level. For the regression including ROE (Model II), 
the coefficient for the percentage of women changed from negative to positive, and the p-value 
became significant at a 1% confidence level. These results are more aligned with the results that 
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were hypothesized and indicate that there is a relationship between ROE and board gender 
diversity. In addition, there was a negative relationship between firm size and ROE. The results 
for these regression models are shown in Table 7.  
Table 7 
Results from Models I and II (whether boards with greater percentages of women are more likely 
to have higher ROA and ROE) using truncated data which excludes the smallest 2% and largest 
2% of ROA and ROE. 
P-values that are statistically significant are noted with a * 
Variable Predicted 
sign 
Model 1b Model 2b 
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Board size + -0.1998 0.2562 -0.4416 0.4348 
Percentage 
of women 
+ 10.8213 0.0175* 38.6238 0.0095* 
Average age - -0.1551 0.1420 0.0600 0.8638 
Firm size + -2.8704 0.0002* -6.4117 0.0079* 
Year-16 + 0.8063 0.4980 4.5530 0.2341 
Year-17 + 1.2312 0.3023 0.7224 0.8511 
Year-18 + -0.0659 0.9574 1.4220 0.7197 
Year-19 + 0.4118 0.7523 2.6563 0.5235 
  
The regressions that include the critical mass variable also yield varying results from 
what was found before trimming for outliers. As mentioned previously, there was no significant 
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relationship established between the critical mass variable and either ROA or ROE. When model 
3 was applied using the trimmed data, the same result was found. No association could be drawn 
between ROA and critical mass. Again, this was not the result that was hypothesized for this 
model. There were two significant variables in this model, though. Average age and firm size 
had a negative relationship with ROA. Model IV, on the other hand, found a positive and 
significant relationship between ROE and critical mass at the 1% confidence level. This result 
aligns with the hypothesis that was formed in the methodology section and indicate that a critical 
mass does matter on boards. The results for Models III and IV are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8 
Results from Models I and II (whether boards with critical masses are more likely to have higher 
ROA and ROE) using truncated data which excludes the smallest 2% and largest 2% of ROA and 
ROE. 
P-values that are statistically significant are noted with a * 
Variable Predicted 
sign 
Model 3b Model 4b 
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Board size + -0.2886 0.1239 -1.0613 0.0748* 
Critical 
mass 
+ 0.9676 0.2824 8.0673 0.0049* 
Average age - -0.1924 0.0678* -0.0237 0.9447 
Firm size + -2.5154 0.0008* -6.0554 0.0103* 
Year-16 + 1.0031 0.4025 4.9893 0.1901 
Year-17 + 1.4638 0.2229 1.2633 0.7408 
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Year-18 + 0.1797 0.1448 1.8268 0.6422 
Year-19 + 0.8265 0.6347 3.2452 0.4299 
 
 
5. Evaluation of Results – Implications and Areas for Further Research 
 This section of the thesis will evaluate the results that were explained above. It will also 
discuss the implications of these results and provide direction for future research on this subject.  
The results from model I confirm the previous research which finds a positive 
relationship between return on assets and board gender diversity such as the study by Erhardt et 
al. (2003). Considering the data for the Erhardt et al. (2003) study was from 1993 to 1998, these 
new results indicate that as boards have become more diverse, this positive relationship 
continues to hold true. Similarly, Carter et al. (2010) also found a positive relationship between 
financial performance and board gender diversity, but they measure financial performance in 
terms of Tobin’s Q. Still, this builds an even stronger case for the inclusion of women on boards 
and their impact on financial performance if the impact on financial performance can be 
measured via varying metrics.  
 In contrast, the results laid out in this paper find a relationship that opposes prior research 
from Vemala et al. (2018). Similar to this research, their sample consists of firms from the S&P 
500; however, the primary difference is that their sample is from 2000 to 2011. This suggests 
that as boards become more gender diverse this relationship will become increasingly 
established. Other research from Daunfeldt and Rudholm (2012) also found a negative 
relationship with ROA and the percentage of women on a board. This research is different in that 
it uses Swedish firms and includes firms of all sizes, rather than just large companies. Similarly, 
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Adams and Ferreira (2009) also use a sample which includes firms from the S&P 500, S&P 
MidCaps, and S&P Small Cap firms. As mentioned previously, the sample used for this research 
was limited to firms from the S&P 500 which only includes large, publicly-traded companies. 
Based on the contrasting results found, more current research including smaller and mid-sized 
firms should be conducted to understand whether a shift has occurred in the relationship between 
ROA and the performance of firms of differing sizes.  
When considering model III, there has been no previous research which considers the 
relationship between ROA and critical mass. However, these results indicate that a critical mass 
may not be necessary for female board members to influence a firm’s ROA. This means that just 
one or two female board members impacted firms’ ROAs, rather than needing a critical mass of 
three women present on the board.  
 Considering the models that include ROE, the results from model II confirm the research 
by Vemala et al. (2018) which also finds a positive relationship between ROE and board gender 
diversity. Much of the other literature does not address the impact of the percentage of women 
on ROE. Though there was limited research which considers critical mass theory, the study by 
Joecks et al. (2012) was the primary basis for adding the critical mass variable to this research. 
The results found from Model IV find the same results that Joecks et al. (2012) do. Considering 
the lack of research that accounts for critical mass, this is a significant finding. The results from 
both of these models combined with earlier research make a strong case for the importance of 
female board members in impacting ROE, especially for the inclusion of a greater proportion of 
women on boards. 
Overall, these results should encourage the election of more female board members, as it 
would be a smart business decision to help improve important financial ratios for the company. 
29 
 
While the results suggests that just one or two women can impact a company’s ROA, there is no 
compelling reason not to have more women than that on the board. A negative relationship was 
not found between ROA and critical mass, meaning it would not hurt companies to have three or 
more women serving on their board. In addition, having at least three women on the board could 
also help improve companies’ ROEs. While this research is promising in building a business 
case for the inclusion of women on boards, there are limitations to the applications of the current 
literature.  
As mentioned previously, one important area for further research would include smaller 
and mid-sized firms. One of the challenges of completing this type of research is that data for 
these firms is not as widely available; however, this is an area where the current literature is 
lacking. Another gap in the existing literature is the consideration of the intersection of different 
identities when discussing diversity. The sole focus of much of the current research is on gender 
diversity or racial diversity. These two types of diversity intersect to shape the experiences of 
board members. Although some of the current literature in this area considers both of these types 
of diversity, they often do not consider how these variables impact one another. Further, there is 
no research which considers other pieces of identity such as sexual orientation and ability status. 
As boards shift to become more gender diverse, they are likely becoming more diverse in other 
ways as well, and the role that this plays in firm performance would be interesting to consider.  
Once again, this sort of research would be difficult to perform at this time due to the lack 
of available data. This may change in the near future, however. The Nasdaq stock exchange has 
proposed a standardized disclosure framework that would require all companies listed on this 
exchange to follow certain disclosure rules (“Nasdaq,” 2020). It would also require boards to 
have at least two diverse directors, “including one who self-identifies as female and one who 
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self-identifies as either an underrepresented minority or LGBTQ+” or explain why they do not 
(“Nasdaq,” 2020). This is similar to the German “comply or explain” policy that was referenced 
earlier. In the research by Joecks et al. (2012), the researchers find that as these policies have 
been put into place, and boards are consisting more frequently of critical masses of women, ROE 
has improved for German firms. Based on the similar findings in this research which also 
indicates a positive relationship between ROE and critical mass, but within firms in the United 
States, the policy suggested by the Nasdaq may be effective in achieving greater diversity whilst 
positively impacting firms. This type of reform could also be adopted by the New York Stock 
Exchange to promote diversity efforts more broadly in the United States.  
The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) still has to approve the proposal, 
however. The passage of this plan would be a significant step in increasing transparency relating 
to the demographics of board members in the United States. This would not only allow for 
improved and more in-depth research on this subject, but it would also improve the information 
available to consumers and shareholders. This is significant in that it would allow shareholders to 
make more informed decisions when electing board members, and consumers would have the 
opportunity to demonstrate their preferences for companies that choose to embrace diversity at 
the board level through their buying behaviors. In a time when diversity and inclusion efforts 
have become of increased concern for companies in the United States, this research further 
promotes the importance of these efforts.  
It also makes a distinction between simply having diverse boards and working towards 
the inclusion of diverse board members as demonstrated by the confirmation of the critical mass 
variable’s relationship with ROE. This application of critical mass theory promotes the idea that 
firms must go beyond performative actions for diversity and inclusion. They must work to treat 
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their diverse employees as more than tokens and create settings that are more equitable and 
inclusive, where women and those in other generally underrepresented groups will no longer face 
the phenomenon of being the only person in the room like them. Finally, more diverse corporate 
boards have the potential to create more equitable opportunities at every level of firms and better 
alignment with the various stakeholders of firms including customers and employees. As boards 
of directors become more diverse, there is potential to spark changes that are much broader 
















Appendix A: Companies Included in Sample 
Companies Included in Sample 
Company Name Exchange:Ticker  Industry 
3M Company NYSE:MMM Industrial Conglomerates 
Adobe Inc. NasdaqGS:ADBE Application Software 
Agilent Technologies, Inc. NYSE:A Life Sciences Tools and Services 
Akamai Technologies, Inc. NasdaqGS:AKAM Internet Services and Infrastructure 
Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. NasdaqGS:ALXN Biotechnology 
American Electric Power 
Company, Inc. 
NasdaqGS:AEP Electric Utilities 
AmerisourceBergen Corporation NYSE:ABC Health Care Distributors 
Aon Plc NYSE:AON Insurance Brokers 
Apple Inc. NasdaqGS:AAPL Technology Hardware, Storage and 
Peripherals 
Applied Materials, Inc. NasdaqGS:AMAT Semiconductor Equipment 
AvalonBay Communities, Inc. NYSE:AVB Residential REITs 
Bank of America Corporation NYSE:BAC Diversified Banks 
BlackRock, Inc. NYSE:BLK Asset Management and Custody 
Banks 
Boston Properties, Inc. NYSE:BXP Office REITs 
Brown-Forman Corporation NYSE:BF.B Distillers and Vintners 
CarMax, Inc. NYSE:KMX Automotive Retail 
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Carnival Corporation & Plc NYSE:CCL Hotels, Resorts and Cruise Lines 
CenterPoint Energy, Inc. NYSE:CNP Multi-Utilities 
Chevron Corporation NYSE:CVX Integrated Oil and Gas 
Costco Wholesale Corporation NasdaqGS:COST Hypermarkets and Super Centers 
CVS Health Corporation NYSE:CVS Health Care Services 
Delta Air Lines, Inc. NYSE:DAL Airlines 
Devon Energy Corporation NYSE:DVN Oil and Gas Exploration and 
Production 
Expedia Group, Inc. NasdaqGS:EXPE Internet and Direct Marketing 
Retail 
FirstEnergy Corp. NYSE:FE Electric Utilities 
FMC Corporation NYSE:FMC Fertilizers and Agricultural 
Chemicals 
Ford Motor Company NYSE:F Automobile Manufacturers 
General Electric Company NYSE:GE Industrial Conglomerates 
Hess Corporation NYSE:HES Oil and Gas Exploration and 
Production 
HP Inc. NYSE:HPQ Technology Hardware, Storage and 
Peripherals 
Humana Inc. NYSE:HUM Managed Health Care 
Intuit Inc. NasdaqGS:INTU Application Software 
Jacobs Engineering Group Inc. NYSE:J Construction and Engineering 
Kimberly-Clark Corporation NYSE:KMB Household Products 
34 
 
L3Harris Technologies, Inc. NYSE:LHX Aerospace and Defense 
Lumen Technologies, Inc. NYSE:LUMN Alternative Carriers 
McDonald's Corporation NYSE:MCD Restaurants 
Mohawk Industries, Inc. NYSE:MHK Home Furnishings 
Molson Coors Beverage Company NYSE:TAP Brewers 
News Corporation NasdaqGS:NWSA Publishing 
NIKE, Inc. NYSE:NKE Footwear 
NVIDIA Corporation NasdaqGS:NVDA Semiconductors 
O'Reilly Automotive, Inc. NasdaqGS:ORLY Automotive Retail 
Sealed Air Corporation NYSE:SEE Paper Packaging 
The Kroger Co. NYSE:KR Food Retail 
The TJX Companies, Inc. NYSE:TJX Apparel Retail 
Tyson Foods, Inc. NYSE:TSN Packaged Foods and Meats 
Under Armour, Inc. NYSE:UAA Apparel, Accessories and Luxury 
Goods 
Walmart Inc. NYSE:WMT Hypermarkets and Super Centers 








Appendix B: Results of Truncation at 5% 
This appendix is included to show the results of trimming the data to exclude the largest 5% and 
smallest 5% for ROA and ROE. This removes 24 boards from each sample, leaving a sample of 
226 data points versus 250 in the full sample and 240 in the previously truncated sample. This 
makes the sample significantly smaller. Utilizing this set of data, the results from Model I 
shifted. The relationship between the percentage of women and ROA was no longer significant, 
although it remained positive. The results for ROE remained somewhat similar when compared 
to the other set of trimmed data. Again, a positive relationship was established between both the 
percentage of women and critical mass variables. These results were significant at a 5% 
confidence level.  As mentioned previously, a stronger case can be made to trim the data in the 
sample used for ROE than with ROA. This could explain the differences in the results from the 
ones established previously. The results for Models I and II using this set of data is included in 












Results from Models I and II (whether boards with greater percentages of women are more likely 
to have higher ROA and ROE) using truncated data which excludes the smallest 5% and largest 
5% of ROA and ROE. 
P-values that are statistically significant are noted with a * 
Variable Predicted 
sign 
Model 1c Model 2c 
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Board size + -0.2507 0.1060 -0.5082 0.2887 
Percentage 
of women 
+ 1.8915 0.6509 28.1896 0.0297* 
Average age - -0.1497 0.1092 0.0364 0.9028 
Firm size + -2.0027 0.0036* -3.1594 0.1252 
Year-16 + 0.6538 0.5364 0.7594 0.8142 
Year-17 + 1.6944 0.1148 1.1973 0.7118 
Year-18 + 1.0522 0.3377 0.9783 0.7702 









Results from Models III and IV (whether boards with critical masses are more likely to have 
higher ROA and ROE) using truncated data which excludes the smallest 5% and largest 5% of 
ROA and ROE. 
P-values that are statistically significant are noted with a * 
Variable Predicted 
sign 
Model 3c Model 4c 
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Board size + -0.2361 0.1454 -0.9749 0.0532* 
Critical 
Mass 
+ -0.3321 0.6795 5.7517 0.0182* 
Average age - -0.1621 0.0776* -0.0168 0.9543 
Firm size + -1.8151 0.0067* -2.8533 0.1551 
Year-16 + 0.7090 0.5014 1.2160 0.7048 
Year-17 + 1.7894 0.0943* 1.6109 0.6163 
Year-18 + 1.1680 0.2848 1.3572 0.6831 
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